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	Central Intelligence	Agency	05
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•	Washington, D. C. 20	0505	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Honorable Robert C. M Assistant to The Presiden National Security Affai	t for	
SUBJECT	Soviet Activities Leading	to the Summit	
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SUMMARY			
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
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<ul> <li>economic pressures are behind the Soviet interest in arms control;</li> <li>the summit could appear to sanction aggressive American policies if it fails to make progress in arms control;</li> <li>there is little ground for optimism at the summit; and</li> <li>Moscow may have to wait out the present US administration in order to begin serious negotiations.</li> </ul>	25X1
<u>Human_Rights_Issues</u>	
9. With respect to human rights issues, the Soviets continue to allege that the United States is a significant violator of human rights worldwide, while continuing to signal a willingness to make concessions on highly visible dissident cases.	25X1
10. The Soviet media have used Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union as a case exemplifying US "illegal" activities and manifesting state terrorism. On 9 November Pravda described Yurchenko as a Soviet diplomat on a mission in Italy who was "forcibly kidnapped by persons unknown and taken across the ocean having been rendered unconscious by powerful drugs." In a clear effort to link the event to US human rights violations, Pravda exclaimed that this was an "utterly gross flouting of the elementary norms of human morality and international law."	25X1
11. Similarly, in their efforts to exploit the situation in South Africa, TASS in conjunction with a report issued by the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid in late October condemned the United States and its closest allies for its alleged policy of broadening military-political support for the racist regime of South Africa.	25X1
12. Conversely, on 1 November, a Soviet journalist privately told a US embassy official in Moscow that the Soviets may grant "amnesty" to Shcharanskiy and permit him and others, including Ida Nudel, to leave the Soviet Union by the end of November. The information, which was probably intended for Western use, reportedly came from a Central Committee meeting, and suggests that Gorbachev intends to make the humanitarian gesture to President Reagan before the summit to sweeten the atmosphere. The report was similar to one from another Soviet journalist received by the embassy several days earlier. A 12 November US Embassy report from Moscow indicates that rumors are circulating about Shcharanskiy's impending release.	25X1
13. The recent disclosures through the Western press and private conversations with US officials on the fate of Soviet human rights "celebrities" show a careful separation of those disclosures from official Soviet commitment. Although these disclosures appear to have the sanction of the government, and suggest a Soviet desire to be accommodating on human rights for the summit, they can be plausibly denied. In any event, no releases or visas are expected before the summit. If the Soviets are not satisfied with the summit results, they can deny the stories, delay any exit	
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	three Soviet gover Gorbachev is making because of his *1	rnment officials sep ng numerous enemies	on ploy to evoke pre-su arately confided to a U among the conservative grams, and might eventu p.	S citizen that bureaucracy	25 <b>X</b> ′
					25X1
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		Summit		
22: The m	ajor Soviet propa		v on the eve of	the summit
appears to be a	leftist demonstr	ration planned	for 16 Novmeber	in Geneva.
out leaflets adv afternoon demons festival" at the	rng the week or s vertising the den stration, the lea e university that in care of the P	monstration. aflets call for t same evening	In addition to t participation and for contrib	
23. The So the Press Center	oviets are also p r in Geneva. The	oreparing a car e main briefin	mpaign for the w as on the summit	estern press at
here Leonid Zar	nyatin, the offic	cial spokesman	for Gorbachev.	Several well-

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs	
FROM :	Director of Central Intelligence	
SUBJECT :	Soviet Activites Leading to the Summit	
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Central Intelligence Agency



1 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane

	Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs	
SUBJECT	: Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit	
1. This Soviet action	is the fourth report in the biweekly series you requested on s leading up to the summit.	25X
criticize the President's Union US concess	Soviets continue their campaign of fostering expectations of arms control agreements to be reached at the November meeting.  activities in the last two weeks have continued to US Administration's preparations for the meeting, including the November announcement of a new US proposal, in the ng the US public and its policymakers—as well its Allies—pressions. Soviet influence activities continue, with diplomatic and unications, conferences, demonstrations, front group pressures,	25X1
private commu and a worldwi	de propaganda campaign.	25X
		25X1
	Soviet Media on the Summit	

3. The initial TASS reaction to President Reagan's press conference statement announcing the new US proposal to be presented at Geneva was negative. Proposal details provided to the US press were described as a "leak of an organized and purposeful character."

25X1

The Soviet media continues to accuse the US Administration of an offhand approach toward the upcoming meeting. At the same time, Moscow seeks to highlight the differences that may exist between the US Administration and other influential bodies in the US as well as abroad. For example, the Soviet press states that Moscow's proposals have "evoked a positive response from many prominent politicians and public figures in different countries, members of their governments and parliaments, and members of the anti-war movement." Even in Washington a "certain shift" has been observed, where Soviet proposals

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
	TOP SECRET
where "sensibl including cong	dismissed out of hand as another propaganda exercise, and e, realistic ideas are maturing in "US public and political, ressional, circles."
approaches, "t are turning fa unspecificity the Strategic reductions dif the last momer if the summit press, Preside presentations 'tough line'.	coviet press alleges that, as the US-Soviet summit meeting the wheels of the White House political and propaganda machine aster. Soviet press statements typically maintain that the of the US positions makes the questions of concessions regarding Defense Initiative (SDI) and reciprocal and equal arms ficult. In the Soviet view, "it is unreasonable to delay until at, since the positions of the sides need to be agreed in advance meeting is to be as productive as possible." In the Soviet ent Reagan is urged to make "honest, frank, and unambiguous of positions," to "abandon the constant demonstrations of a 'inflexibility', and 'ability to bargain'," and to adopt instead we tone if, of course, the President is truly prepared for
claim to be a 26 October, You presentation of figures. Zhulwell elaborate toward accordance proposals, and Nations once supporters."	Soviets have also continued their efforts to highlight what they broad worldwide support for their proposals. For example, on uriy A. Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, made a TV which showed friendly interviews with leading West German cov reiterated that the Soviet Union "is going to Geneva with a ed and constructive program of action which opens up a path. But from Washington we have so far heard no constructive if the speech that President Reagan deliveredin the United again gives rise to alarm in the minds and hearts of the peace
printed in The attacking US Treaty and SD "businesslike article was a October. Akhreharsher tone"	additional attempt to propagandize their positions, the Soviets <u>Washington Post</u> on 25 October a statement by Marshal Akhromeyev positions on arms control, and the current analysis of the ABM I in particular, accusing the US of showing no signs of and constructive preparations" for the Geneva meeting. This translation of its Russian version published in <u>Pravda</u> on 19 comeyev's article developed in a more authoritative and in a the arguments put forward in <u>Krasnaya zvezda</u> on 11 and 19 October mir Chernyshev, TASS reviewer on military matters.
	Peace Demonstrations
Prize to the	Soviets have tried to capitalize on the recent award of the Nobel International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) to viet positions.
demonstration	nhagen was the scene last week of the latest in a series of peace s in Scandanavian cities. The demonstration drew 30,000 in response to the theme "Scandanavia as a Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone."	
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	Leaks on Human Ri	ights	
10. The Sovie	ts initially used "leaks"	to lessen public	pressure on
human rights issues			
	International Confe	erences	
11. The Sovie	ts have used a number of m	eetings, confere	nces, and other
events to press the	ir attacks on SDI and US a	rms control posi	tions. Moscow
12. Earlier t	his month General Secretar	y Gorbachev pers	onally addressed
disarmament issues	his month General Secretar through messages to the So	viet front, Worl	d Federation of
disarmament issues	through messages to the So g in Mosç <mark>ow, and to the Cl</mark>	viet front, Worl	d Federation of
disarmament issues Trade Unions meetin environmental organ	through messages to the Sog in Moscow, and to the Clization.	viet front, World ub of Rome, an i	d Federation of nternational ese journalists,
disarmament issues Trade Unions meetin environmental organ  13. A two-day held in Tokyo last	through messages to the Sog in Moscow, and to the Clization.  roundtable conference of week, produced expressions	Soviet and Japan of concern over	d Federation of nternational ese journalists,
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16. Soviet Bloc statements on the President's UN speech have been negative, maintaining that the "main focus of the speech was in no way one of the most burning problems of nuclear disarmament, but on other issues." President Reagan's proposal for the settlement of regional conflicts was

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viewed "essentially as an attempt to attain international legislation for its acts of international banditry on a par with their inglorious incursion and occupation of Grenada. Washington, as demonstrated by the President's speech, has no intention of renouncing this policy."	25 <b>X</b> ′
17. In discussing the speech, Vitaliy Kobysh, Chief of the US Sector of the CPSU International Information Department, bluntly stated on 26 October that the "Soviet Union is willing to discuss regional conflicts, the more so in view of the fact that the neutralization of these conflicts and the ending of bloodshed does indeed depend upon the United States with its course of state terrorism and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other people." He rejected what he saw as the President's effort to draw public attention away from the main issues, stating that "on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting the world public expects not diplomatic games and propaganda tricks, but a demonstration of a serious and responsible approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of the present day."	25X <sup>2</sup>
UN Lobbying	
militarization of odds. Spaces	25X^
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Memorani	DUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs	
FROM	: Director of Central Intelligence	
SUBJECT	: Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit	
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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington D.C. 20505

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ER2

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Returned herewith, per your request of 6 August 1985, is the sanitized transcript of the 12 September 1985 hearing on Soviet Active Measures before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sincerely,

10/ 1 " TO B GORDY

William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence

### Enclosure

Distribution:

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Central Intelligence Agency



1 8 OCT 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

: Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

1. Herewith is the third report in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet actions leading up to the November summit. It incorporates changes in format and expands the subject matter beyond active measures as requested by your staff. Included you will find intelligence material, for your background, that addresses the Soviet pre-summit line and principal negotiating issues, as well as evidence of Soviet efforts to use propaganda, front groups and other tactics to posture themselves for several possible summit outcomes.

25X1

2. Since tabling their formal arms control proposals at Geneva early this month, the Soviets have floated several subsequent informal proposals-some at Geneva, and some through visiting Soviet officials in the United States--which hint at willingness to back away from some of their earlier stands. It is not yet clear what status these recent hints have, or to what extent they portend real flexibility. Except for these ploys, we have not discerned, during the last two weeks, any tactical shifts in Soviet active measures targeted for the November meeting in Geneva. Soviet activities continue to seek to create a favorable atmosphere for Moscow by running an extensive propaganda campaign, announcing a series of public arms control initiatives, and attempting publicly and privately to have West European leaders and publics pressure the US to make concessions.

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
Background

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	e USSR has taken the offensive in presenting et proposals have been criticized in the US media,
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane

Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Leading to the Summit

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane

Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Recent Soviet Active Measures

Herewith is the second in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet Active Measures.

Active Measures That Relate to the Summit

- 1. In its open propaganda, the Soviet Union continues to berate the US for taking the arms race to outer space and for mounting an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. "Krasnaya Zvezda" for 26 September 1985 published an article charging that "The White House is stubbornly trying to attribute its own sins to the Soviet Union" and that the US has an unconstructive and "not quite honest" approach to the November meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev. Another authoritative article charges the President with pursuing "the aim of justifying refusal to conclude an accord with the USSR at the forthcoming summit." A recurring theme charges US failure to respond to peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union. If there is no summit or if it fails to measure up to public expectations, a large body of world opinion will have been well coached to blame the US.
- 2. Novosti Press Agency has sent hundreds of news items and commentaries from both Soviet and Western media sources to its Latin American offices regarding the upcoming summit meeting. The common theme in these articles is that the US is pressing Latin American nations for debt repayment in order to channel additional funds into arms expenditures at the expense of the already impoverished economies of those nations.

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3. In India, the Novosti office was scheduled to begin a major press and propaganda campaign on 15 September 1985, the objective of which was to project Soviet peace proposals in a favorable light and to mobilize public opinion behind the Soviets during the November meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev. The "Times of India" for September 28 carried what is probably the beginning of this campaign in an editorial page piece entitled "American Disinformation an Ally in US-Soviet Rivalry." The article is a litany of charges of the United States spreading disinformation on subjects ranging from the Soviet military build-up to genocide against Miskito Indians.

4. USSP appoints no substantial to

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USSR expects no substantive results from the summit meeting. The objective is to obtain a favorable media image of Gorbachev as a flexible and moderate Soviet leader of the new generation who seeks peace, cooperation, and increased East-West contacts. He expects to be portrayed in contrast to an older and dogmatic Reagan. The Soviet strategy is to use the summit to create additional pressures on the US from its European allies.

## Active Measures Which Denigrate the US

5	
	It is planned

that by October articles and editorials about human rights violations in the West will begin appearing in Soviet newspapers. This counteroffensive is being launched in response to what the Soviets see as a renewed campaign by the United States and other NATO countries to press them harder on the issue of human rights.

- 6. A new forgery has been brought to our attention. In early September 1985, an unsigned letter was sent to President Kyprianou of Cyprus. The letter's author presents himself as a British "Foreign and Commonwealth official" who is upset over the fact that the British Government is permitting bases in Cyprus to be used for US actions against Arab countries.
- 7. The Nigerian press has been carrying articles with undocumented accusations of US dumping nuclear waste material

-2-

in Somalia.

Also in Nairobi, the "Kenya Times" carried an accusation that the US had provided Kenya with poisonous and spoiled corn. This is similar to charges earlier this year that the United States was sending spoiled food to Ethiopia.

8. In Venezuela, the Soviets have been working through local communist and radical parties to attempt to block the appointment of Otto Reich as the new US Ambassador to Venezuela and damage relations between Venezuela and the US. A contribution to this campaign was made by TASS in a 24 August release titled "Links of the Same Chain," which labeled Reich a "Cuban counterrevolutionary" who is closely linked with the CIA. Denigration of US ambassadors is a common theme in Soviet Active Measures worldwide. Ambassador Dean is the target of a similar campaign in India.

9.	

/s/ William J. Casey

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William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

- 3 -

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Active Measures

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
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S E C R E T Central Intelligence Agency





2 0 SEP 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane

Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Active Measures

Herewith is the first in the biweekly series you requested on Soviet Active Measures.

In the "Pravda" rendition of his "Time" magazine interview, Gorbachev is quoted as saying: "Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements with regard to the United States. It is not resorting to anti-American campaigns nor is it fomenting hatred for your country." An examination of both open Soviet propaganda and recent Soviet Active Measures operations demonstrates this claim to be untrue. Recent anti-American campaigns related to the Summit run and orchestrated by the USSR include:

Active Measures That Relate To The Summit

1. A worldwide effort surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative is under way. There are regionally geared themes designed to capitalize on local sensitivities. In TASS dispatches to Japan in January and August 1985, as well as in the Soviet newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" in August, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are cited as examples of US irresponsibility in the use of nuclear weapons. The charge was made in the Indian newspaper "Patriot" (well known for its Soviet connections) that the Indian Ocean in general and Diego Garcia in particular would be used by the United States in its SDI program. In

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Europe, the approach has been more sophisticated. In numerous TASS dispatches around the world, the SDI program has been labeled as offensive in nature designed to give the US a first-strike capability. This theme was discussed in "Star Wars: Delusions and Dangers", distributed by Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1985. The Soviet Union has laid the groundwork for walking out of the arms negotiations talks by saying that any arms agreement between the US and the USSR is impossible until the US abandons the SDI program.

2. Personal denigration of US leaders: President Reagan is said to be lost in a world of his own, in a world divorced from reality. It is said that he does not like to study details or engage in analysis; that he does not read books; that he makes one mistake after another, displaying his ignorance, sometimes making outright lies. Defense Secretary Weinberger is labeled a liar on the issue of protests against neutron death. These charges appeared in a Soviet propaganda booklet entitled "Gathering Clouds: Whither Soviet-US Relations?", published by Novosti Press Agency in Moscow in late 1984 and distributed worldwide in thousands of copies in 1985.

## Active Measures That Denigrate The US

There has been a massive world effort to disprove the "Bulgarian Connection" thesis in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II by shifting blame onto the United States. The magnitude of this effort suggests that a very sensitive nerve has been struck in the Soviet Union by the implication of Soviet involvement. Numerous books and pamphlets have been published which seek to discredit the Bulgarian connection thesis: "The Crime in St. Peter's Square", by Eduard Kovalyov, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1985; "The Assassination Attempt Against the Pope and the Roots of Terrorism", by Ivan Palchev, Sofia Press, Sofia, 1985; "Der Papst und der Morder: die Manipulation des Ali Agca", by Jacques Drescher, Luxembourg, 1985; "The Bulgarian Connection: Accusation without Proof" Sofia Press, Sofia, 1985; "The Conspiracy Against Bulgaria", by the Colombia-Soviet Institute in Bogota, 1985; "John Paul II, Agca, the Connection", by Christian Roulette, 1985; "The Pope-the-Mafia-Agca", by Ugur Mumcu, Ankara, 1984; and "Shots in St. Peter's Square", by Herbert Rechel, West Germany, 1985. Soviet front groups such as the International Association of Democratic Lawyers are also being used to question the legality of putting on trial the Bulgarian who is charged with aiding Agca. Press placement operations are underway around the


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world; and the returned defector Oleg Bitov recently has written a series of articles on the trial for "Literaturnaya Gazeta".

- 4. The theme of State Terrorism as a United States Government policy is being spread by the Soviet Union worldwide. A book entitled "International Terrorism and the CIA" (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983) deals with this subject at length and continues to be quoted. Recent TASS dispatches have reported that the FBI is running terrorist training camps in the United States, linking this theme to the crash of the Indian airplane, the rash of assassinations in India, and even to the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.
- 5. There has also been renewed focus on the charge that KAL 007 was on a spying mission for the United States Government. The Soviet news agency TASS stated that the plane's pilot had deliberately sent wrong data about the altitude of his flight to Japanese air traffic control, "proving that the aircraft's commander knew well that he had crossed the Soviet frontier and that he knew the nature of his mission." This charge was echoed in European newspapers and television reports. There are reports of another edition of a suspected Soviet Active Measures operation book, "The President's Crime", by Akio Takahashi, this time in India where the crash of the Indian airplane near Ireland in June of this year has been linked to the KAL 007 tragedy. This book has appeared previously in Japanese and Russian language editions.

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence



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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 6, 1985

William Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I appreciate the assistance your Agency has given us in preparing for our hearings this month on Soviet Active Measures. It is my understanding that the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Bob Gates, will be leading your briefing team on September 12. We look forward to his presentation.

In order to ensure prompt, public dissemination of a sanitized version of his remarks in our printed hearings volume, I would ask your help in facilitating the Agency's review of the transcript for that purpose.

Thank you again for you cooperation. With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Senator Richard G. Lugar Chairman, Senate Foreign

Relations Committe

RGL:chp

cc:Robert M. Gates Deputy Director for Intelligence



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